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Mozambique remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with a GDP rank of 169 and a 
Human Development Index of 172 (UNDP 2009). Trying to recover after nearly three 
decades of war, it became a donor darling, and aid has been rising steadily for the past decade 
(see Figure 1). Mozambique receives significantly more aid than neighbours at a similar level 
(see Table 1) – Malawi (GDP rank 172, HDI 160) and Tanzania (GDP 157, HDI 151) receive 
only 60 percent per capita of the aid of Mozambique. This may be because Mozambique is 
one of the few countries to be loyally following a neo-liberal, free market development policy 
and is apparently also reducing poverty (Hanlon and Smart 2008; De Renzio and Hanlon 
2009). Both Malawi and Tanzania have publicly opposed donor economic policies. 
 
A national family-consumption survey (IAF, Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares) in 1996-97 
showed that 69 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. A similar study six 
years later offered two alternative figures: 63 percent based on the same poverty line; or 54 
percent based on changed consumption patterns which effectively lowered the poverty line 
(MPF/IFPRI/PU, 2004). Poverty lines were based on food baskets; between the two surveys, 
poor people switched to cheaper, lower quality food, which, it was claimed, allowed the 
poverty line to be lowered. Perhaps not surprisingly, government and donors accepted the 
lower percentage, which appeared to show a dramatic fall in poverty in only six years. In 
keeping with this, Mozambique’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Action Plan to 
Reduce Absolute Poverty 2006-2009 (Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta, 
PARPA II), called for a further cut to 45 percent by 2009. Some of us argued that the higher 
poverty figure was more realistic, because the reduction in the number of people below the 
poverty line came about mainly by lowering the line, and because no other survey showed 
such a dramatic fall in poverty (Hanlon and Smart 2008: 61). This provoked a fierce debate 
with the authors of the IAF report (Savana, January 25, 2008). The 45 percent target has 
proved a hostage to fortune. Both donors and government staked their prestige on a 
continuing huge fall in poverty, but the National Agricultural Survey (Trabalho de Inquérito 
Agrícola, TIA), a nationally representative household-income survey, indicates that far from 
declining, poverty is actually increasing, as is the gap between rich and poor.  
 
Officially, 70 percent of the Mozambican population is rural and agriculture is the 
predominant economic activity in Mozambique. The smallholder sector accounts for 99 
percent of all farms, which means that the further reduction in poverty called for in PARPA II 
is dependent on enhancing farmers’ incomes. PARPA II recognises this and prioritises 
agricultural development to increase rural incomes and reduce absolute poverty. PARPA II 
calls for a transformation of agriculture through the promotion of agrarian services, and 
increased productivity and production. We argue here that this has not happened. 
 
In this paper, we first look at data sources, then consider what they show about changes in 
poverty and income. The paper continues by pointing to the lack of changes in farming, which 
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contribute to the persistence of poverty;  considers cash income and the poverty trap in 
Mozambique; discusses the failure of the donor-led development model; looks at 
Mozambique and other countries for alternative policies that might reduce poverty and raise 
agricultural production; and the finally considers pressures for and against changing policy. 
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Figure 1: Aid to Mozambique, excluding debt relief, in constant 2007 $ 
Source: OECD 2010. 
 
 
Table 1: Aid per capita, Mozambique and its neighbours 
Source: OECD 2010; UNDP 2009. 
Aid = disbursements excluding debt relief 
 
$ per capita ODA  2006 2007 2008 
HDI Rank GDP  Rank 
Rwanda 58 71 90 167 168
Mozambique 64 79 89 172 169
Zambia 63 70 87 164 152
Malawi 42 48 56 160 172
Tanzania 43 51 54 151 157
Uganda 48 53 52 157 163
Zimbabwe 22 37 49  
Swaziland 39 46 49 142 109
   
Africa South of 
Sahara 32 37 44  
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Data sources 
We use data from the TIA of 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. The surveys were 
implemented by the Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture. The sampling 
frame draws heavily on the Census of Agriculture and Livestock of 1999-2000. The TIA 
samples were stratified by province and agro-ecological zone. All of the TIA surveys 
collected production and marketing data for each crop, ownership of livestock and the basic 
characteristics of members of each household. TIA02, TIA05 and TIA08 are the three most 
comprehensive surveys, with detailed information on household-income components. 
Additionally, data on small and medium-sized farms were complemented by group interviews 
at the community level, field measurements and a separate questionnaire for all large-sized 
farms. All the figures presented throughout the paper are population-weighted unless 
explicitly mentioned. Sample size was approximately 5000 in 2002 and 2003, and 6000 in 
subsequent years; coverage increased from 80 districts in 2002 to all 128 districts in 2008.  
 
Mozambique is a large country with quite variable and differentiated climatic conditions – 
most years have droughts and floods somewhere – but 2005 had widespread droughts and 
thus poorer crops than normal, while 2006 was a better than average year. The years 2002 and 
2008 were broadly similar (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean per capita maize production (kg) 
Source: TIAs. 
 
 
For income, we use data from the TIAs of 2002, 2005 and 2008, which included household-
income questions. Cash income includes all cash received by households. However, the bulk 
of food eaten in rural areas is produced by peasant farmers for their own consumption. We 
use farm-gate prices to estimate crop and livestock incomes. The prices are ‘averaged’ 
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(medians) by district, province and region, and used in this particular order. For example, if a 
farmer produces 100 kilograms of maize, the value of production of maize is obtained by 
multiplying the quantity produced by the median price for that district. If district prices are 
not available, then we use provincial prices. If provincial prices are also not available, then 
we use regional prices. All income figures are inflated to 2008 prices. For each product in 
TIA08, we compute the price ratio between TIA08 and TIA05. These price ratios are based 
on median prices from each year and district in TIA08 and TIA05. Since TIA08 had a larger 
coverage, some of the districts sampled were not used in the calculation of the deflators. Then 
we aggregate the price ratios at the provincial level, and thus obtain ten provincial deflators, 
corresponding to ten provinces sampled in TIA, which excludes Maputo and Matola cities. 
TIA02 had already been inflated to 2005 price levels and the deflator/inflator is described in 
Mather et al. (2008). This does, however, create certain distortions – income is higher in the 
drought year of 2005 because the farm-gate prices of food consumed were higher in that 
shortage year – so higher imputed income does not mean greater welfare or more food eaten. 
Total income is the sum of cash income and imputed income from own production. 
 
Two broadly based social surveys are also compared. The Demographic and Health Survey 
2003 (IDS, Inquérito Demográfico e de Saúde), recalculated using as base the 2006 WHO 
standard population, was compared to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2008 (MICS). 
Finally, we draw on four studies done as part of the donor-government evaluation of PARPA 
II (Cunguara and Kelly 2009a and 2009b; Grupo de Estudo 2009; Kelly, 2009). 
 
 
Rural income and poverty 
Median and mean rural household incomes for 2002, 2005 and 2008 are given in Table 2. 
Both the median (half-way point) and the mean (arithmetic average) are reported because the 
median is better for analysing poverty as it is not influenced by the extreme values (very poor 
or very rich households), and gives a better picture of the incomes of groups of people, while 
the gap between mean and median gives information about the distribution of the incomes. 
Table 2 shows that median income was 10 percent lower in 2008 than 2002, and was lower 
for most income groups. This suggests poverty is increasing rather than decreasing. Median 
rural income in 2002 was 8626 Meticais ($329) per family per year, but this was down to 
7815 Meticais ($298) by 2008 – less than $1 per day for an entire family. Table 3 shows the 
percentage of people below a poverty line of roughly $1 PPP per day; although there have 
been changes in some provinces, the 2002 and 2008 figures are the same, at 81 percent. 
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Table 2: Total household income by decile and year (Source: TIAs.) 
 
Decile 
of total 
house-
hold 
income 
Mean household 
income (2008 
Meticais) 
Median household 
income (2008 
Meticais) 
Mean household 
income (2008 US$) 
Median household 
income (2008 US$)
 2002 2005 2008 2002 2005 2008 2002 2005 2008 2002 2005 2008
Bottom 
decile 1.220 1.164 928 1.277 1.113 904 47 44 35 49 42 35
2 3.205 3.029 2.454 2.841 2.900 2.458 122 116 94 108 111 94
3 4.713 4.823 3.878 4.109 4.213 3.819 180 184 148 157 161 146
4 6.358 7.054 5.576 5.744 6.046 5.792 243 269 213 219 231 221
5 8.643 10.088 7.515 8.239 8.390 7.682 330 385 287 315 320 293
6 11.506 14.042 10.189 10.780 11.346 9.587 439 536 389 412 433 366
7 15.653 20.009 13.892 14.698 16.142 12.230 598 764 530 561 616 467
8 22.156 29.162 20.651 19.978 24.403 18.330 846 1113 788 763 932 700
9 33.566 48.898 33.470 28.383 44.713 32.322 1282 1867 1278 1084 1707 1234
Top 
decile 106.523 127.395 95.175 65.824 95.696 65.748 4067 4864 3634 2513 3654 2510
Total 19.255 24.292 18.985 8.626 10.232 7.815 735 928 725 329 391 298
 
 
 
A closer comparison of means and medians in Table 2 shows that income is quite skewed. 
Overall, mean rural income is two and a half times median rural income, but for the six 
poorest deciles mean and median are very close. The top 10 percent has a mean income five 
times the national average and has half of all rural income, but the big gap between mean and 
median in the top 10 percent indicates that a small group is relatively wealthy. Figure 3 is 
another way of looking at inequality. It uses kernel density functions, which are basically 
smoothed histograms depicting household-income distribution for 2002, 2005 and 2008. If the 
entire curve shifts to the right, it shows an increase in household incomes; this appears to 
happen between 2002 and 2005. But the shift between 2002 and 2008 is to the left, showing a 
fall in income. If the distribution becomes flatter and shifts to the right, as between 2002 and 
2005, it shows that while average household incomes have increased, wealthier households 
significantly increased their incomes, while the incomes of poorest households decreased. In 
short, the economy grew between 2002 and 2005, but the distribution of incomes worsened as 
income inequality increased.  
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Table 3: Income poverty headcount (%) by province and year 
Estimates are based on total household incomes in per capita terms. $1.08/day PPP poverty line. 
Source: TIAs. 
 
Province 2002 2005 2008
North    
   Niassa 77 68 70
   Cabo Delgado 87 80 86
   Nampula 79 76 89
   Zambezia 89 85 85
Centre    
   Tete 84 79 82
   Manica 84 72 74
   Sofala 83 64 76
South    
   Inhambane 59 55 73
   Gaza 84 73 80
   Maputo 62 58 63
Total 81 75 81
 
 
 
Nutrition also shows that poverty levels are not changing very much. Nationally, chronic 
malnutrition (low height for age or stunting) for children under five years old fell from 48 
percent in 2003 to 44 percent in 2008, but this is still considered ‘very high’ by the World 
Health Organisation (Grupo de Estudo 2009). Stunting is a good indicator for the well being 
of a population, as it reflects the structural context surrounding malnutrition. If young 
children are exposed to sub-optimal nutrition at certain key stages in their physiological and 
mental development, they are unable to reach their full potential height and this opportunity is 
irreversibly lost; it cannot be regained, even if the conditions for nutrition improve and a child 
gains in weight. Ministry of Health figures show that low birth weight rates are not 
improving: they were 10.9 percent of births in 2006 to 11.3 percent in 2008, a difference that 
may not be statistically significant, but definitely is not better. Figure 4 shows one reason for 
the very high levels of chronic malnutrition in Mozambique: on average, farmers only 
produce enough food to feed their families adequately for less than eight months of the year, 
and this is not changing. Table 4 shows that the poorest families only produce enough to 
provide adequate food for half the year. 
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Figure 3: Kernel density function for household income 
Source: TIAs. 
 
 
Figure 4: Months with an adequate food supply from farmers’ own production 
Source: TIAs. 
 
Although income and nutrition are not improving, there are improvements in human-capital 
and deprivations-based measures of poverty. The 2008 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 
indicates considerable improvements in human capital, notably education and health. 
Although it remains extremely high, the under-five mortality rate was reduced from 153 
deaths per 1,000 live births in 2003 to 138 in 2008.  Positive trends were also observed with 
respect to literacy rates and primary school enrolment and attendance rates, although the 
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absolute numbers remain low when compared to international standards. At the present rate of 
improvement, however, Mozambique will not meet several Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). 
 
Child poverty, as measured through the deprivations-based approach, was reduced 
significantly from 2003 to 2008, from 59 percent to 48 percent (see Kelly 2009 for more 
details). The link between resource allocation, policy actions and the resulting changes in 
childhood poverty is made much more explicit using the deprivations-based approach, rather 
than the consumption or income-based approaches to poverty measurement. For example, the 
increased allocation of funds toward the rapid expansion of immunisation programmes would 
have an immediate and direct impact on child poverty under the deprivations-based measure, 
but would feed through to the consumption or income-based measures somewhat more 
slowly. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that while Mozambique has had reasonable 
success in expanding and improving basic services to its citizens, it has been far less 
successful in promoting the agricultural sector, employment opportunities and the incomes of 
the rural population. 
 
Table 4: Months of adequate food supply from farmers’ own production of the main staple crop 
by quintile of household income, 2008 
Source: TIA 2008. 
 
 
Quintiles of household income in 2008 
Bottom quintile 2 Mid quintile 4 Top quintile 
6.11 6.94 7.04 7.7 8.15 
 
 
 
Low technology and little change 
PARPA II places great stress on reducing poverty through increased agricultural productivity 
and production, but this is not happening. Maize is Mozambique’s main staple crop. Figure 2, 
which showed the bad year of 2005 and the unusually good year of 2006, also makes clear 
that maize production levels have not changed in the past decade. Table 5 shows the poverty 
implications – the poorest 20 percent of rural people produce only 1 percent of the country’s 
maize, while the top 20 percent produces more than half.  
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Table 5: Maize production by quintile 
Source: TIA 2008 
 
Percent distribution of total maize production by quintile 
Year Bottom quintile 2 
Mid 
quintile 4 
Top 
quintile 
1996 2% 5% 10% 20% 63% 
2002 1% 6% 11% 22% 59% 
2003 1% 5% 12% 22% 60% 
2005 0% 4% 11% 23% 63% 
2006 1% 6% 11% 23% 59% 
2007 1% 5% 11% 22% 60% 
2008 1% 5% 12% 20% 61% 
 
 
 
Low productivity results from low and declining use of equipment and inputs, as shown in 
Table 6. More detailed data from the TIAs shows that improved technology is only used 
where there are special conditions. Northern Mozambique has the highest agricultural 
potential but, with a few exceptions, the lowest use of modern technology. For example, only 
3 percent of Mozambican farmers use chemical fertilisers, and that is largely on tobacco 
where it is supplied on credit by an international tobacco company, and on a few other cash 
crops. But in the north, where expensive fertiliser can only be purchased in towns, only 0.2 
percent of farmers use fertiliser on maize (compared to a majority of farmers in Malawi, see 
below). Only 2 percent of farmers use tractors and 11 percent use animal traction, and most of 
those who use animal traction or tractors are in the south, even though the most productive 
land is in the north. One reason is trypanosomiasis disease in cattle, which does not occur in 
the south but is widespread in the north; lack of experience, training and veterinary services 
combine to create an insurmountable hurdle to the use of oxen in the north. 
 
Table 6: Trends in access to improved technologies and hired labour 
Source: TIAs. 
.. = not asked in 1996 
 
 1996 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008
Used irrigation (%) 4% 11% 6% 6% 8% 8% 3%
Used animal traction (%) 7% 11% 11% 9% 12% 11% 11%
Used chemical fertilizers (%) 1% 4% 3% 4% 5% 4% 3%
Used pesticides (%) .. 7% 5% 5% 5% 7% 3%
Belongs to a farmers association (%) .. 4% 4% 6% 7% 8% 7%
Received extension visits (%) .. 14% 13% 15% 12% 10% 8%
Hired permanent labour (%) .. 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Hired seasonal labour (%) .. 16% 16% 18% 24% 21% 19%
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Table 7: % of farmers using improved technology, membership of farmers associations,  
and hired labour, by income quintile 
Source: TIAs. 
 
 Chemical fertilisers  Pesticides  
Member of 
association  
Hired seasonal 
labor 
Quintile 2002 2005 2008  2002 2005 2008  2002 2005 2008  2002 2005 2008
Bottom 2% 2% 0%  3% 3% 1% 2% 5% 4%  4% 7% 6%
2 2% 3% 2%  5% 4% 2% 3% 7% 8%  7% 9% 12%
3 4% 5% 3%  7% 6% 3% 4% 9% 7%  13% 14% 15%
4 6% 5% 6%  9% 9% 5% 5% 10% 9%  22% 22% 23%
Top 10% 10% 7%   13% 10% 5%  9% 13% 10%   35% 39% 38%
Total 5% 5% 4%   7% 6% 3%  5% 9% 8%   16% 18% 19%
 
 
Table 6 also shows that use of irrigation, chemical fertilisers and pesticides are all falling – in 
part due to higher input prices caused by higher fuel prices. Similarly, high fuel prices sharply 
cut the number of visits by agricultural extensionists. In Mozambique, inputs are not, in 
general, subsidised, and the very low use creates a vicious cycle, with low sales causing low 
import volumes and thus higher prices. Table 7 looks at chemical use by income; as expected, 
better off farmers are more likely to use chemicals than poorer farmers, but the drop in the use 
of chemicals by better off farmers is noticeable. Better off farmers produce most of the maize, 
but they do it by farming more land, not by increasing productivity. Thus it appears that not 
only have none of the PARPA II targets to increase irrigation, extension and use of improved 
seeds and fertiliser been met, but that the trend is actually the opposite, with a decrease. 
 
 
Cash and the poverty trap 
Cash income in rural Mozambique is low and hugely skewed, as shown by Figure 5 and Table 
8. The median cash income of Mozambican families in 2008 was 2750 Meticais ($105) per 
year, just $2 per week for the entire family. This must be used to buy clothing, school books, 
cooking oil, medicines and food in the lean season. As figure 5 shows, incomes are hugely 
skewed, with the top 5 percent earning on average 153,000 Meticais ($5842) per family per 
year – not a lot of money by global standards, but relatively wealthy by Mozambican 
standards. 
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Rural family cash income, divided into 20 income groups
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Figure 5: Rural annual household cash income, divided into 20 income groups 
 
Looking at Tables 2, 8 and 9, we can loosely identify three groups. The first group, the 
bottom 60 percent, earn less than half their income in cash, and survive mostly on the own 
production. Most have a total income of under $1 per day for the entire family. Cash income 
is derived from small crop sales, typically a few kilograms at a time, and is matched by small 
sales of charcoal or other forest products or locally produced beer. Some carry out some day 
labour on neighbours’ fields.  Total income was significantly less in 2008 than in 2002. 
Although cash income was actually higher in 2008 than 2002, this group is still only 
marginally in the cash economy. 
 
Table 8: Household cash income  (Source: TIAs)  All data corrected to 2008 Meticais, exchange rate 
$1 = Mt 26.19. Cash income = actual cash earned per household per year. 
 
Median  (Meticais) Mean  (Meticais) Median  (US $) Mean  (US $) Decile 
of cash 
income 
in each 
year 
2002 2005 2008 2002 2005 2008 2002 2005 2008 2002 2005 2008
Bottom 
decile 0 0 0 7 106 2 0 0 0 0 4 0
2 172 539 195 213 752 231 7 21 7 8 29 9
3 414 1.365 600 524 1.647 724 16 52 23 20 63 28
4 956 2.530 1.390 1.131 2.944 1.644 36 97 53 43 112 63
Mid 
decile 1.748 4.096 1.975 2.091 4.827 2.762 67 156 75 80 184 105
6 2.895 6.190 3.000 3.828 7.375 4.494 111 236 115 146 282 172
7 4.710 9.097 5.065 6.420 11.418 7.419 180 347 193 245 436 283
8 8.821 15.559 8.080 12.076 18.668 12.305 337 594 309 461 713 470
9 18.019 31.637 19.000 22.995 35.257 22.568 688 1.208 725 878 1.346 862
Top 
decile 53.096 77.534 52.732 93.159 108.858 79.193 2.027 2.960 2.013 3.557 4.156 3.024
Total 2.085 4.653 2.750 12.888 17.311 13.296 80 178 105 492 661 508
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The remaining 40 percent earn more in cash than the value of what they produce for self-
consumption. They can be divided into two groups, one in the 7th through the 9th deciles, with 
total family incomes of $1 to $8 per day, and of which half to two-thirds is in cash. The large 
non-cash component means they are more productive farmers, even for their own 
consumption, and Table 9 shows they also sell. As Table 7 shows, these are also the farmers 
using chemical fertilisers and pesticides, and they are more likely to be in associations. In 
effect, many are commercial farmers producing a cash crop, and not simply selling surplus 
maize. But as Table 9 makes clear, it is off-farm income, both wage labour and self-
employment, that lifts them into the upper income group. Remittances – mainly from family 
in cities and towns (and, in the south, from migrant miners) are important. Incomes are 
volatile, but the best off in this group are better off than they were in 2002. Finally there is a 
top 10 percent, with major wealth differentials. There are some significant commercial 
farmers, but most income comes from non-agricultural wages or business. 
 
The bottom 60 percent are largely outside the market, and constitute an invisible majority in 
Mozambique. They are caught in what is known as the ‘poverty trap’ – that you cannot pull 
yourself up by your bootstraps if you have no boots. They are basically too poor to participate 
in the market. For the very poor with very little money, everything is more expensive 
(Addison 2008). Buying in small quantities is always more expensive than buying in bulk; 
selling maize by the ‘lata’ (a large can used as a measure) always earns less per kilo than 
selling by the sack or the lorry-load. Transport to the nearest town, as well as clothing, 
medicines and school books, cost a larger share of income. Risk is perhaps the biggest issue – 
the poorest have no savings, and must be conservative and reduce risk. Thus to use scarce 
cash to buy fertiliser is a huge risk when the investment may be lost due to poor or excessive 
rains or low prices. The poverty trap works at community level too. When no one has money 
to buy, it makes no sense to produce more to sell on the local market. Even those who do 
trade are likely to sell only small quantities, and thus earn little for their day sitting in the 
market or by the roadside – as can be seen by the tiny average cash incomes of the poorest. 
The tiny piles of tomatoes and other vegetables and the few buyers in many local markets in 
Mozambique is a vivid demonstration of the poverty trap. 
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Table 9. Shares of different sources of cash income by decile 
Source: TIA 2008 
All data corrected to 2008 Meticais, exchange rate $1 = Mt 26.19. 
 
2008 Meticais 
Deciles  Crop 
Livestoc
k 
Remit-
tances Pensions
Farm 
salary 
Non-
farm 
salary 
Self-
employ-
ment Total 
Bottom 
decile 80 12 37 1 8 0 8 145
2 96 35 21 1 34 4 40 231
3 334 75 71 20 88 14 167 770
4 582 129 290 16 183 65 386 1.651
5 895 194 309 16 339 175 881 2.809
6 1.418 224 499 43 320 567 1.420 4.492
7 1.797 358 902 97 534 1.199 2.504 7.389
8 2.500 510 1.052 261 761 2.626 4.594 12.305
9 3.636 552 1.666 1.105 575 8.276 6.703 22.513
Top 
decile 5.886 1.922 2.192 2.392 1.026 26.209 39.503 79.131
Total 1.723 404 701 398 385 3.966 5.731 13.309
    
2008 US $ 
 Crop 
Livestoc
k 
Remit-
tances Pensions
Farm 
salary 
Non-
farm 
salary 
Self-
employ-
ment Total 
Bottom 
decile 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 6
2 4 1 1 0 1 0 2 9
3 13 3 3 1 3 1 6 29
4 22 5 11 1 7 2 15 63
5 34 7 12 1 13 7 34 107
6 54 9 19 2 12 22 54 172
7 69 14 34 4 20 46 96 282
8 95 19 40 10 29 100 175 470
9 139 21 64 42 22 316 256 860
Top 
decile 225 73 84 91 39 1001 1508 3021
Total 66 15 27 15 15 151 219 508
 
 
Failure of the donor model 
For the past two decades, Mozambique has followed a development model largely set by the 
international community, and which argues that donors and government should stress human 
capital (health and education) and infrastructure (roads, electrification and 
telecommunication), and, more recently, ‘governance’. Economic growth and poverty 
reduction were to be left to the private sector. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
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have become an integral part of this policy, with emphasis put on MDG Goals 2 to 6 – 
education, gender and health. The bias toward human capital has been pushed by the donors – 
aid to the social and governance sectors in Mozambique doubled in just six years, from $477 
million in 2003 to $990 million in 2008. Budget support jumped from $172 million to $452 
million between 2003 and 2008, and that also largely goes to social sectors (OECD Stat). A 
mark of the unquestioning promotion of this model was the 2005 statement by a visiting 
Norwegian aid official that ‘everyone knows’ that poverty is fought through investment in 
health, education, water and roads (Castel-Branco 2007). 
 
MDG Goal 1, to ‘end poverty and hunger’, has largely been ignored, and left to the private 
sector and foreign investment. Goal 1 has three targets: halve the proportion of people whose 
income is less than $1 a day, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, 
and halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. Mozambique seems not to be 
moving toward the Goal 1 targets, yet both the government and donors leave the economic 
sectors as areas outside their concern. 
 
There has been substantial foreign investment in Mozambique, but it has been primarily in 
mineral and energy ‘mega-projects’. Rapid economic growth with GDP rising by more than 6 
percent a year for the past decade wins high praise from the international community, and has 
been driven by these ‘mega-projects’, but they create few jobs and have few local linkages. 
Over the next decade, mineral and energy exports will provide an increasing share of 
government revenue, but this is not a development strategy. Mozambique remains 
predominantly rural, and in the short and medium term, agriculture must remain a central 
component of development and poverty reduction. Import-substitution industrialisation will 
never compete with China, but specialised agriculture and agro-industry can sell to the Asian 
market, creating jobs and raising incomes, and can grow in parallel with increased food 
production (see, for example, Kaplinsky 2006). This is already happening in a small way, 
notably in Nampula, where some smallholders have increased the production of sesame, 
which is exported to Asian and European markets.  
 
The government talks much about the ‘green revolution’, which is supposed to end rural 
poverty. But it is not happening. Half of Mozambicans are peasant farmers using only a hoe 
and no modern inputs, farming as their great grandparents did. Improvements in health and 
education are not, so far, having an impact on the countryside. Indeed, poverty appears to be 
increasing. Data from the most recent National Agricultural Survey (TIA 2008) confirms that 
poverty is growing and use of modern technology is falling. The Chr Michelsen Institute 
(CMI) of Norway is doing a long term study of poverty funded by the UK Department for 
International Development, which should shake up the donor community (Tvedten et al. 
2009): 
Our surveys confirm national data on improvements in education and health. 
However, we also show that people are in the process of losing faith in education 
as a vehicle for upward social mobility... Above all, the surveys have confirmed 
the importance attached to employment, income and fair prices for agricultural 
products for alleviating poverty.  
 
Two decades of a donor-led, liberal, free-market rural development strategy have failed not 
just in Mozambique, but across Africa. Countries were pushed to privatise what were 
previously state services and close marketing boards in the belief that if a truly free market 
was established, farmers would respond to price signals to produce the most profitable crops 
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and pull themselves out of poverty. But the opposite happened, as production and productivity 
stagnated and the poorest peasants dropped back into subsistence production. A study by Gabi 
Hesselbein (2010a and b) of the London School of Economics points to the lack of change in 
agricultural productivity across Africa; and she notes that two of Mozambique’s neighbours, 
Tanzania and Zambia, developed visions similar to Mozambique’s ‘green revolution’, based 
on market liberalisation and which placed responsibility on the private sector and the districts. 
As in Mozambique, the strategy failed; farmers are too poor to purchase seeds and fertiliser or 
invest in irrigation (Hesselbein 2010b). A new study published by OECD on fragile and post-
war states (OECD 2010: 20) notes that: 
donor assistance to the development of the capacity of fragile states to manage the 
economy has been limited largely to programmes to improve macroeconomic 
management. The lack of attention to the productive sectors is especially 
important in relation to agriculture. Markets left entirely to their own devices are 
unlikely to underpin new growth trajectories, particularly in the risky 
environments found in most fragile states. 
So, after 17 years, the OECD notices that the policy imposed on Mozambique after its war 
was ‘unlikely’ to work; and it didn’t (Hanlon 2010a). 
 
The ahistorical nature of neo-liberal policies and their failures in Africa have led writers to 
look both at history and at the actions of other, more successful, countries. Hesselbein (2010a) 
argues that ‘the initial conditions in Europe, before industrialisation, were very similar to 
those found in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa’. There were complaints in mid-nineteenth 
century Europe about lazy peasants; economists came to realise that the physical labour of a 
subsistence farmer was so hard that ‘when working longer hours of arduous work only 
increases the yield insignificantly, the work will not be done, or only be done at the threat of 
one’s own starvation’. Agricultural stagnation was only overcome when farmers were given 
inputs, such as fertiliser and machines, that made the work less back-breaking, plus consumer 
goods that made their lives less hard; and this tended to involve the active intervention of the 
state, particularly directing investment but also using tax policy to curb unproductive elite 
consumption and shift the money to investment. The state needs to be actively involved in the 
shift from subsistence to a market rural economy. 
 
Development economists such as Ha-Joon Chang (2008) of Cambridge are looking back at 
both nineteenth-century Europe and the Asian Tigers of the late-twentieth century and finding 
different models. South Korea is often cited, because it had been colonised (by Japan) and 
then went through a war, and was similar in many ways to African countries in the late-
twentieth century. A study by the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO 1997) looked at 
what it saw as the success of aid to South Korea:1  
The South Korean government largely initiated, directed, and organized 
development by setting goals, establishing priorities, and backing them up with 
resources. Large, highly profitable private companies were clearly subordinate to 
the government, in part because the government controlled domestic credit as well 
as the right to borrow abroad.  
The government also put in place a number of incentives such as subsidies and access to 
subsidised credit. The CBO notes that perhaps the most important role of aid was that it 
‘increased the pool of available investment capital’.  
                                                 
1 Non-military aid to South Korea in the 1970s was, in real per capita terms, double the aid to Mozambique now. 
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The CBO report pointed out that foreign aid was particularly important in upgrading South 
Korean agriculture, where it was used for research and agricultural extension, and to promote 
the use of fertiliser. US aid helped Korea build five fertiliser plants. Yet, for the subsequent 
two decades, the international community prohibited exactly those successful policies in 
Africa, and in particular in Mozambique, which was forced to close its marketing board, 
dismantle agricultural research and end state support for production of modern seeds. All 
protection and support, except for foreign multinational companies, was stopped. Subsidy was 
not allowed. 
 
An alternative: reducing risk 
Fertiliser subsidies are proving to be important in Africa as well. In contrast to many other 
African counties, Rwanda has a highly interventionist policy. A fertiliser subsidy pushed 
fertiliser use from 2 percent to 62 percent in just two years. Government guarantees credit to 
farmers; and it promotes farmer marketing associations and agribusiness, including 
companies that do peasant contract farming under which peasants grow an agreed crop and 
the company guarantees to buy, as with tobacco in Mozambique (Hesselbein 2010b; Hanlon 
and Smart 2008).  
 
In Malawi, a fertiliser subsidy turned the country from being dependent on food aid to being a 
maize exporter in just two years. In the 2004 election, all the leading candidates promised 
government support for smallholder agriculture and fertiliser subsidies to end food insecurity. 
Donors were opposed and during the campaign warned that debt relief under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative would be delayed if a fertiliser subsidy was 
introduced. Bingo Wa Mutharika was elected in May 2004, but in the face of such fierce 
donor opposition, he delayed until he then came under heavy parliamentary pressure, and 
finally announced a broadly based fertiliser subsidy in June 2005, funded entirely from the 
government budget. Each household receives coupons allowing the purchase of two 50 kg 
bags of subsidised fertiliser, seed and storage pesticides; by the 2006/2007 season the 
programme reached 1.7 million families (70 percent of farm households). Partly helped by 
good rains, maize yields doubled and production jumped dramatically; in 2007 Malawi 
exported 300,000 tonnes of maize to Zimbabwe (Chinsanga 2007; Chinsinga and O’Brien 
2008; Denning et al 2009). Fertiliser prices are linked to oil prices, and in 2008 fertiliser 
prices were double that of 2006, while by early 2010 prices had fallen back close to 2006 
levels. International maize prices, in turn, partly follow oil prices. The Millennium Villages 
Project estimated that it cost $82 in 2006 and $135 in 2008 in fertiliser and seed to produce an 
extra tonne of maize (Denning et al 2009). UNCTAD figures show the global price of maize 
ranging from $160 per tonne in late 2006 to a peak of $250 in 2008. Retail maize prices in 
Malawi and northern Mozambique are similar, and ranged from $150 to $300 in the same 
period (Zavale et al. 2009); so the subsidy is roughly half the value of the extra production. 
As an FAO study (Buffie and Atolia 2009) concluded: 
The subsidies do all good and no harm.... Input subsidies are highly effective in 
reducing smallholder poverty.... They buy a substantial increase (17-41 percent) 
in the smallholder income along with a small but significant rise (2-5 percent) in 
the real unskilled wage. 
Faced with the obvious success of the subsidy, donors could not impose any sanctions. But 
many remain opposed. Some argue that subsidies create market distortions while others argue 
that the money would be better spent on infrastructure. The IMF had been one of the most 
vociferous opponents, but the April 2010 issues of IMF Survey Magazine had unexpected 
high praise for the fertiliser subsidy: ‘Malawi’s recent robust economic growth has enabled 
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one of Africa’s poorest countries to make real strides in reducing chronic food insecurity and 
progress toward poverty reduction.’ This is partly because of ‘several bumper harvests for 
tobacco, the principal cash crop, and maize, stemming from good rainfall and the distribution 
of subsidized fertilizer.’ 
 
It is uncertain if a subsidy alone will have a significant impact on crop incomes in rural 
Mozambique. The vulnerability of peasant farmers to drought, floods and pests suggests that 
input subsidies should be strongly accompanied with a favourable market policy. 
 
Two important interventions in Mozambique show what can be done with a coordinated 
approach. The cashew-nut sector’s destruction by World Bank enforced liberalisation in 1995 
became notorious, which created space for a quiet reversal of policy in the 2000s. A state 
agency, Incajú, reintroduced protection (in direct and explicit violation of the World Bank 
rules) and discreetly worked with a domestic development agency and a handful of 
sympathetic donors to create the entire value chain – peasant production, state spraying and 
plant protection, marketing, new shelling and processing factories, and coordinated export – 
to create thousands of jobs and record production in the 2009-2010 season. Tobacco is the 
other success. It has become Mozambique’s most important export crop and has done more 
than any single intervention to reduce poverty. A single TNC, the US-based Universal Leaf 
Tobacco, which is the world's leading leaf-tobacco merchant and processor, has been given 
exclusive rights over tobacco production in much of the country. More than 150,000 peasant 
families participate in its outgrower schemes, in which seeds, fertiliser and training are 
provided on credit, and there is a guaranteed market, but the tobacco must be sold to the 
company. Net profits for better farmers are over $500 per year. The company has now built a 
tobacco-processing factory, which created 1600 jobs. ULT has created something similar to 
the old marketing boards, but no foreign investor has suggested anything similar schemes for 
other crops.  Perhaps ULT is willing to do it because of its dominance of the global market 
(Hanlon and Smart, 2008: ch. 5 and 6).  
 
The theory behind liberalisation and the abolition of marketing boards common in most 
African countries was that state-owned boards were expensive and inefficient, and in a totally 
free market peasants would capture more of the surplus and prosper. But this nice theory 
failed to take into account a central issue in agriculture throughout the world: risk. In 
exchange for potentially higher prices, peasants also had to accept all the risk of weather, 
pests and fluctuating markets. The poverty trap also came into play: fertilisers and extension 
services supplied by marketing boards may have been more expensive, but farmers did not 
have to pay up front, with the cost deducted from the payment for the crop. Most peasants 
have too little money to pay for inputs, even if they do cost less, and the marketing boards 
effectively provided insurance because if there was a generalised crop failure the input costs 
were not repaid. What we are observing, yet again, is the central importance of reducing risk: 
peasants are prepared to accept significantly lower profits in exchange for credit, insurance 
and a guaranteed market. Hesselbein (2010b) identifies lack of markets as the biggest 
constraint in both Tanzania and Zambia. The CMI study (Rosário et al 2009) says that in 
Mozambique ‘publicly supported local and adapted alternatives to the previous ‘marketing 
boards’ should be considered.’  
 
The core demands identified by CMI – income, jobs, and fair and assured market – are 
broadly agreed, so shared risk, guaranteed markets and subsidised technology will be central 
to reducing rural poverty. UNCTAD (2006) argues that domestic demand is the largest 
contributor to economic growth, but that generalised and persistent poverty means that 
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demand is small, which inhibits growth. This is obvious from rural markets where women 
with small piles of onions or tomatoes chat to each other because there are no customers. For 
this majority of rural people, the need is more cash, which will trigger an upward spiral as 
people buy from each other. That means helping people to grow more by taking away the risk 
– especially by guaranteeing markets for the staples such as maize that people already grow 
for family consumption – and by providing subsidised inputs on credit. Jobs, even temporary 
day labour, must be created. It may also require cash transfers such a child benefit or non-
contributory pensions (Hanlon et al. 2010). 
 
Earlier we pointed to three groups in rural areas. The bottom 60 percent earn less than half 
their income in cash and survive mostly on the own production; this group is still only 
marginally in the cash economy. The next 30 percent earn more in cash than they produce on 
their farms. They have significant non-farm income, but they are also more productive 
farmers, even for their own consumption, and they also sell. They are also the farmers using 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides, and they are more likely to be in associations. In effect, 
many are already commercial farmers producing a cash crop, and not simply selling surplus 
maize. For the top 10 percent, most income comes from non-agricultural wages or business.  
 
Poverty reduction, agricultural growth and development must be a priority for the lower 90 
percent, but will be different for the two groups. For the lowest group, the need is to raise 
technological levels to the point where working harder brings significant gains, so as to 
improve their own food production. But as most of this group already say, the real need is to 
create at least part time jobs, which provide more income than working on their own farm. 
Part time jobs are also effective in buffering the negative effects of climate variability, which 
are becoming increasingly common, implying that they should be clearly part of any 
development effort in rural Mozambique. Nevertheless, policy makers should avoid creating a 
vicious cycle whereby the poor are relegated to low return jobs (because they lack the 
necessary education or assets to profitably invest in high return activities). The promotion of 
such jobs should not exacerbate income inequality. 
 
But it is the middle 30 percent who are already small commercial farmers, in that they 
consciously produce some crops for the market, and who will provide the significant 
economic growth, jobs (as Table 7 shows, this group is a significant employer of at least 
seasonal labour) and raw materials for export and for local processing, which will create other 
jobs. Many of the people in this 30 percent group remain dependent on off-farm income, so 
one issue is how to shift them into seeing farming as a commercial activity. Again, assured 
markets are key, but these are likely to be for crops grown intentionally for the market, such 
as tobacco, cashew and sesame. They will require more and higher level technical support; 
government will need to promote machinery-hire companies that can rent out tractors and 
harvesters to farmers too small to own their own. Machinery-hire companies should in turn 
guarantee a provision of timely services, and ensure that the peasant farmers have priority in 
accessing such services, considering that poverty reduction will be faster if the benefits of 
growth in agricultural production and productivity are biased toward the poor. Long term 
credit and technical support for up to seven years will be needed for the development of tree 
crops including nuts, mangoes and citrus fruit, and for farmer association-owned marketing 
companies, such as Ikuru in Nampula province (Hanlon and Smart 2008). 
 
 19
 
Is such a policy change possible? 
The dawning recognition that poverty is not being reduced, at least not as quickly as 
previously thought, is forcing some rethinking, but it is proving very slow. Prominent 
establishment Mozambicans are speaking out. Young people rioted in the capital Maputo on 
February 5, 2008 against the rising cost of living; five people were killed and more than a 
hundred injured, many shot by police. Rogério Sitoe, editor-in-chief of the government owned 
daily, Noticias, wrote a remarkable column arguing that the root cause is ‘the religious way 
we applaud and accept the prescriptions of the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund’, when these are really ‘poison prescriptions’. They have destroyed jobs and failed to 
promote agricultural development, which has ‘contributed greatly to the impoverishment of 
the countryside and forced a migration to the cities, particularly of the youth.’ The 
government needs its own development policy and needs to stop treating World Bank and 
IMF statements as if they were ‘bible verses’ (Notícias, February 15, 2008). 
 
Later that year, Professor Firmino G. Mucavele, formerly Chief Executive of NEPAD and 
now head of the Agronomy Faculty of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, argued that 
Mozambique’s much talked-about ‘green revolution’ cannot be simply providing a few 
inputs. Instead, it requires radical changes to the entire agricultural value chain, new ways of 
thinking about rural development, a hugely increased role for the state and large amounts of 
money. He stressed that in previous green revolutions, the entire food-production chain – 
choice of crops, inputs, extension, production systems and marketing – went through a 
revolution that was totally externally financed. The state would need to provide vastly 
expanded extension services, step up research particularly on pests and diseases, and would 
have to be buyer of last resort to guarantee a market (Noticias, September 15, 2008). 
 
Then in early 2009, open criticism of the development model was voiced by the Mozambican 
Forum of the Peer Review Mechanism of the African Union. In a self-evaluation report for 
the peer review, the Forum said that ‘the most credible indicators point to an increase in 
absolute terms in the number of people below the minimum subsistence level.’ The report 
(Forum Nacional do MARP 2009: 50 and 82) is caustic about economic policy, pointing to 
the ‘notorious way the economic programme ignored the question of income distribution, 
which means that the principle beneficiaries of growth are concentrated in tiny groups and a 
restricted social strata.’ It goes on to cite ‘the failure to prioritise job creation in economic 
programmes’ and says that the high levels of ‘unemployment result from the application of 
neo-liberal economic programmes, which has a constraining effect leaving many families 
without the minimum level of subsistence.’ The Forum consists of the Mozambican 
establishment; it has 58 members from civil society and the private sector, with three 
provincial governors, the governor of the central bank and representatives of eight 
parliamentary commissions. The review was chaired by Lourenço do Rosário, rector of the 
largest private university, Universidade Politécnica. 
 
Then on 17 May 2010, in a speech in Maputo, the Executive Secretary of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and former Mozambican Finance Minister, Tomás 
Salomão, said western institutions have been telling African governments ‘do what I say and 
not what I do’. Developing countries had thus been obliged ‘to comply with the recipes from 
structural adjustment programmes, often with heavy social costs and little impact on our 
socio-economic development’. The risk now was that attempts would be made ‘to patch up 
the model of ‘structural adjustment’ which has proven to be obsolete and outdated, and does 
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not respond to the challenges that developing countries must overcome’. Salomão (AIM 
News, May 18, 2010) feared that Africa would be faced: 
..with the question: do you want aid? Then do what it says on this menu. Take it 
or leave it. A menu which often has nothing to do with us, or is produced by 
intellectuals who have recently come out of banks and universities, and don’t 
know that Africa is a continent with more than 50 countries of differing socio-
cultural realities. 
The obvious question is why, with the establishment behind it, the Mozambican government 
does not simply stand up to the donors, as the government in Malawi did. Both donors and 
government have invested huge political capital in the current failed model and change will 
be hard. The glib answer is provided by Table 1. Malawi stood up to the donors over fertiliser 
and still has a marketing board; Tanzania stood up to the donors in the early 1990s, and it now 
has an Independent Monitoring Group for aid (Harrison et al. 2009). Malawi and Tanzania 
received only 60 percent as much aid as Mozambique, per capita, which in 2008 was worth 
nearly $800 million to Mozambique. A 2005 evaluation of aid to Mozambique by the 
respected British economist Tony Killick and others (Killick et al. 2005: 50), ironically titled 
‘Perfect Partners’, said boldly: ‘aid dependency does not have to entail subservience’. But 
most Mozambican leaders disagree, and think Salomão rather than Killick is right; looking 
over the border at Malawi and Tanzania, they conclude the subservience pays extremely well. 
Frelimo’s dealings with the international community reflect a long history in which the 
‘West’ was not sympathetic to it. This was shaped by the Cold War. First NATO backed 
Portugal’s attempt to prevent independence and decolonisation. Then Mozambique became a 
Cold War battlefield, and in the 1982-92 proxy war, more than one million Mozambicans 
died; inevitably, many in the leadership see this as an extraordinarily high price that was paid 
for having an independent development policy. Then at the end of the Cold War, the victors 
in Washington used the Bretton Woods Institutions to impose harsh neo-liberal policies on 
post-socialist governments that were still not trusted (Hanlon 2010a and b). Aid was used to 
impose these policies. During the 1980s there were two donor strikes, in which food aid was 
withheld first to force Mozambique to sign an agreement with the IMF and World Bank, and 
then to force it to agree a structural adjustment programme (Hanlon and Smart 2008: 10). The 
next confrontation came in 1995, when the World Bank imposed an unprecedented set of 
‘necessary conditions’ on its programme to Mozambique. If the ‘necessary conditions’ were 
not satisfied, the programme would stop, and since all aid at that time was conditional on 
having a World Bank programme, violation of those conditions would end all aid. Two of 
those conditions were particularly controversial: privatisation of state banks to consortia 
known to be corrupt (which bankrupted the banks and created the high level corruption that 
still plagues Mozambique); and a liberalisation of the cashew sector (which totally destroyed 
the sector). In a debate on cashew on November 24, 1997, Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi 
told parliament that when Mozambique asked for money ‘from the World Bank, the Bank 
imposes its conditions. Sometimes we have to accept things which are not in our interest, 
because there is no other way out’ (Hanlon 2000).  
 
Faced with an international community that is seen to demand an inordinate level of 
obsequiousness while often not acting in Mozambique’s interest, the government is careful to 
avoid frontal confrontations with the donors. It chooses its battles carefully, and then acts as 
discreetly and invisibly as possible. There have been three confrontations. The first, described 
above, was over cashew, where over a decade government intervention in direct violation of 
World Bank policy rebuilt the sector, creating thousands of industrial jobs and an important 
peasant cash crop (Hanlon and Smart 2008: ch 5). It appears to be a model agricultural 
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development, but cannot be widely applied because it was carried out without publicity and 
tolerated by some donors because of the embarrassment caused by the international scandal 
created by the World Bank destruction of the sector. The second confrontation was over a 
campaign pledge by Armando Guebuza in 2004 to create a Mozambican development bank. 
In a response similar to that in Malawi in the same year, donors said they would not allow 
government to create such a bank -- even though Mozambique was one of few countries 
without a development bank, and many donors have their own development bank. The newly 
elected government decided not to confront the donors, and instead quietly inserted a budget 
line to give about $250,000 to each district per year as a development fund. Donors were 
angry, at least partly because they simply did not notice until the budget was passed by 
parliament. Their response was to insist on a change in the agreement between the budget-
support donors and government, in which the donors would see not only the final budget, but 
all preliminary drafts – to insure that nothing they did not agree with was ever again snuck 
into the budget.  
 
The third and most complex confrontation is the on-going struggle over ‘governance’. Here 
Frelimo’s interests are complex. At one level, some in the Frelimo elite stole large amounts of 
money from the privatised banks, and part of this money was used to fund the party; 
prosecuting such people in response to donor demands would destabilise the Frelimo party. 
But at another level, ‘good governance’ is now seen as opening Mozambique to transnational 
corporations and to prevent the support of domestic capital, which has been important in all 
successful national developments, such as the Asian Tigers, and which Mozambique is now 
doing (Hanlon and Mosse 2009). Again Frelimo is trying to avoid a frontal confrontation. 
Instead, each year it promises actions that are never actually carried out. In 2004, one of us 
wrote an article entitled ‘Do donors promote corruption?: the case of Mozambique’, in which 
we argued that there was an implicit compromise to maintain the myth of the Mozambican 
success story, in which both sides claim poverty reduction, Mozambique accepts imposed 
neo-liberal policy prescriptions and the stress on social services, and the donors turn a blind 
eye to corruption and state capture (Hanlon 2004). That deal seems to still be in place, 
because at the May 19, 2010 annual review of budget support, Kari Alanko, Finnish 
ambassador and head of the budget-support group, said that although government 
performance on governance was ‘unsatisfactory’, that its overall performance was 
‘satisfactory’ because of expansion of services, economic growth and inflation control 
(Alanko 2010). 
 
For two decades, donors have been deeply divided on agriculture and rural development 
policy; their attitudes have changed rapidly and there have been divisions within agencies. 
But the one constant has been to keep government out of the economy and agriculture. Thus 
they forced the closure of the marketing board and seed production and curbed agricultural 
research. In 1999, the World Bank actually blocked the government from hiring more 
agricultural extension workers, even though the total number was only one-tenth that 
recommended by the FAO (Hanlon and Smart 2008: 168). The issue is not the policies, but 
the government role. Thus the IMF and other donors allow protection for the sugar sector, in 
which the plantations are owned by trans-national corporations who said their investment was 
dependent on protection, but not for the cashew sector owned by local business. Huge tax 
breaks and other de facto subsidies are permitted for foreign investors, particularly in the 
mineral-energy sector. One of the world’s largest tobacco companies can be given exclusive 
rights to control tobacco production in much of the country and set up what is, in effect, a 
marketing board, but the state is not allowed to create a similar system for other crops. The 
desire to avoid public confrontations with the donors combined with the emphasis that the 
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donors have put on keeping the state out of agriculture makes it impossible for Mozambique 
to introduce a programme like the Malawi fertiliser subsidy. 
 
Another key to the puzzle is that Frelimo lacks a coherent agriculture and rural development 
strategy, and has not been able to have a broad public debate. There are two reasons why 
Frelimo cannot think outside the box and openly debate alternatives. First, the tradition is that 
policy issues should be debated first inside the party and in secret, but Frelimo has been 
unable to build that kind of internal debate. The second is that the budget-support process 
means that donors are deeply embedded inside all the key ministries, and thus intervene 
actively in all policy discussions, which makes it impossible to even consider options that 
donors would oppose (De Renzio and Hanlon 2009). 
 
But the final key rests inside the Frelimo leadership. Frelimo has always stressed big farms: 
state farms in the socialist era, and now trying to encourage foreign companies to invest in big 
farms (often the old state farms). There has always been a distrust of the 30 percent of better-
off peasants who could be commercial farmers – dismissed as ‘kulaks’ in the socialist era, 
their role is still not accepted. In this, there is a curious alignment of interest between Frelimo 
and the donors – both want big foreign-owned plantations as a development strategy and to 
help ‘subsistence’ peasant farmers (the poorest of the poor) almost as a form of social 
welfare. The final piece of the jigsaw is that throughout the ‘greed is good’ 1990s, donors 
promoted the idea that by getting rich, the elite was promoting development. Indeed, as 
recently as 2006 the IMF called for ‘an agricultural and rural strategy to enhance the trickling 
down of growth to the poorest segments of the population’ (IMF 2006). Some of the 
Mozambican elite still believe in ‘trickle down’; for others it is a convenient myth to justify 
the widening gaps between rich and poor − and who in the elite will argue for a different 
policy to help the poor when the elite gain so much from the present policy?  
 
Donors have pushed this development model very hard, and even used the budget-support 
process to ensure that their officials are part of drafting key Mozambican documents such as 
the PARPA. But the Mozambican leadership has also accepted the donor line; thus there 
seems no enthusiasm on either side for a change in policy. Mozambique has been a donor 
darling because of a combination of two factors – subservience to donor policy combined 
with apparently dramatic falls in poverty. If poverty is not falling, will that force a rethink on 
both sides? Can Mozambique and its donors pay less attention to Millennium Development 
Goals 2-6, and more time to MGD 1 – food, income and jobs? This is related to agricultural 
growth and the ‘green revolution’, which in turn requires a recognition that markets do not 
spring up by magic, but instead are created by the state. Will the government try to promote 
markets and the introduction of subsidised new technology, which will allow peasants to 
reduce their back-breaking work while producing more and raising their living standards? 
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